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ABSTRACT 
Privacy is a serious concern to Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology. Several 
companies worldwide scrapped RFID projects because of high resistance from the 
consumers and their advocacy groups – which actually demand RFID-specific privacy 
policies. This concern is even more acute when RFID is used in public applications; 
because, in general case, citizens cannot refuse to provide data, and the data collected by a 
government agency would offer a serious threat if are shared among third parties. Limited 
research has been performed in this specific issue; they all agree that perceived privacy 
increased RFID acceptance. But, what drives privacy perceptions are yet to be researched - 
this study closes this research gap. In order to conduct the current research, the mixed 
method of research approach has been adopted. In the qualitative research stage, the 
authors conducted two focused-group discussions and eight in-depth interviews in two 
different countries: Australia and Bangladesh; arguing that the status, and the perceptions 
and tolerance of the citizens on privacy are different in these two regions. The explored 
factors have been examined with empirical data obtained from these two countries. It is 
found that, there are distinct differences in perceptions in developed and developing 
countries. The detail findings offer practical suggestions to the agency managers so that 
they can ensure better privacy of the citizens. As a significant theoretical contribution, this 
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study enhances the existing literature identifying the antecedents of privacy which play even 
different roles in different cultural backgrounds. 
Keywords – RFID; privacy; public use; mixed method; Australia; Bangladesh 
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1. Introduction 
In ancient times, slaves would collect data and/or information about citizens/subordinates for 
their masters; now, technology replaces the slaves but perform even better (Cas, 2005). 
However, government convinces its people that, identifying a person uniquely is essential for 
a country, and using a technology would produce a better society, in terms of security and 
public facilities. Currently, many countries have developed and implemented radio frequency 
identification (RFID)-based human identification system; national identity (ID) cards and 
electronic passports (e-passport) are the main as the tools to combating potential terrorism 
activities and crimes. Moreover, although often far from realistic nature, the personal 
information which it captures would enhance the service quality of the State e.g. quick and 
accurate disbursement of funds (Can 2005). Unfortunately, some (corrupted) officials 
sometimes consider personal data as ‘commodity’ and expose/sell them to third-party 
(marketing) companies – which is a complete violation of information privacy.  
Information privacy refers to users’ rights “to keep information about themselves from being 
disclosed to others” (Rognehaugh, 1999, p. 125). Maintaining information privacy in the 
current world with ubiquitous technologies is very a complex task (Cas, 2005). For instance, 
in a library RFID technology can develop a profile answering who have used the book, for 
how long, and so on (Dwivedi, Kapoor, Williams, & Williams, 2013). Hence, the use of RFID 
in national systems where citizens’ data is captured creates a significant debate on the 
users’ privacy (Fosso Wamba, Anand, & Carter, 2013; Thornley, Ferguson, Weckert, & Gibb, 
2011). Actually, the basic and fundamental discomfort comes from using RFID technology is 
related to its capability to identify an object uniquely, record real-time and spatial information, 
and linking the information with other (unauthorised) business (Thiesse, 2007). By using 
ubiquitous technologies, more personal data are now harvested and exposed, in terms of 
quality and quantity; however, less effort is observed on privacy protection (Can 2005).  
The extent of behavioural literature on privacy are actually invested their effort to examine 
the effect of privacy toward people’s acceptance of a specific technology (e.g. Hossain & 
Prybutok, 2008)and on privacy protection techniques. Still, ‘satisfactory’ results are not clear 
(Sutanto, Palme, Tan, & Phang, 2013) which could present RFID as “privacy-friendly” 
(Langheinrich, 2009). Actually, the actual problem (and hence the potential solution) lies 
somewhere else. The critics of the technology acceptance model (TAM) often argue that, 
every manager knows that perceived usefulness and ease of use would drive people to 
accept a technology, but what are the drivers of these two constructs are actually more 
important. Similarly, there is a huge literature gap that explores the antecedents of perceived 
privacy of the users and examines their relative effect. Here, perceived privacy is defined as 
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the degree to which a citizen of a given society believes that s/he has the right to control the 
collection and use of her/his personal information, even after s/he disclosed it to others 
(Hossain & Prybutok, 2008). Therefore, the main objective of this study is to explore the 
catalysts of perceived privacy taking RFID as a representative technology and applying in 
national applications. 
Furthermore, this study has been conducted in Australia and Bangladesh realizing that 
people’s view on privacy differs in culture. Prior studies found that RFID-perceptions vary in 
locations (e.g. Leimeister, Leimeister, Knebel, & Krcmar, 2009). Thiesse (2007) believe that, 
“the difference between the valuation of privacy in Western and Asian cultures.... could play 
a much more important role than expected” (p. 227). Comparing between the people of 
Hong Kong and Canada, Bailey and Caidi (2005) found that, difference in cultural notions of 
privacy may affect the acceptance of innovations in information and communication 
technologies. Similarly, Sareen (2005) established that, citizens from Indian, where privacy 
gets lower priority, put personal privacy as the highest priority to their financial transactions. 
Acknowledging the necessity of examining privacy in different cultural settings, this study 
puts a unique effort conducting a field study as well as a survey in Australia and Bangladesh 
applying same interview protocol and survey questionnaire, respectively.  
   
2. Background 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an automated data-capturing and data-storing 
technology. The captured data can be used to identify an object uniquely (RFID-Journal, 
2005). RFID privacy issues is well explored in literature; however, the researchers are 
concerned and concentrated mainly in retail stores item-level tagging (Brown & Russell, 
2007a) and privacy issues of the customers - emphasizing technical and technological 
issues (e.g. Chong & Chan, 2012; Juels, 2006; Kelly & Erickson, 2005; Peslak, 2005). It 
should be noted that, unlike the use of RFID in retail stores where a proper and practical 
implementation of RFID system does not affect individual customers’ privacy (Murray, 2003), 
securing the privacy of the citizens is more sensitive and complex  (Hossain & Prybutok, 
2008; Peslak, 2005). First of all, the customers enjoy all the luxury to reject some 
technologies (e.g. mobile phones, ATM cards or Internet) or reject shopping from an RFID-
enabled shop that may affect their privacy (Gilbert & Shim, 2003) (Masnick, 2003). However, 
many public applications of RFID technology such as e-passport do not leave any substitute 
option; hence, people cannot refuse the technology, and may have little or no choice 
whether to provide personal information (Cullen & Reilly, 2008). The more sensitive part is, 
the applications are not ‘closed’ but necessarily interconnected. For example, the amount of 
‘family assistance’ is decided by the income and number of child(ren); therefore, the data 
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captured from tax office or the hospitals have to be shared by the associated government 
agency. Hence, the captured personal data about the citizens is accessed, handled and 
shared by many departments or authorities. The proposed (but failed) national identity card 
of Australia “intended that thirteen Government agencies would use the Australian Card” 
(Jordan, 2010). Consequently, the issue of citizens’ privacy comes as very prominent and 
thus demands a special attention from the deploying authorities to keep the data confidential 
and inaccessible to any unauthorized use (Kelly & Erickson, 2005). But, several privacy 
leaking through data-abuse incidents such as supplying the citizens’ information to 
marketing companies (particularly with Malaysia’s MyKad) have raised and/or strengthened 
public concern and perception protecting privacy with highest priority. Hence, this current 
study addresses a sensitive and timely issue of privacy, in the context of RFID use in a much 
focused area – national applications – which is actually scarcely researched. 
National identity card (e-ID) is the main application of RFID technology in public applications. 
Malaysia is the first country that introduced RFID-based national identity card (MyKad) in 
2001 (Thomas, 2004). Several other nations including Hong Kong, Estonia, Finland, 
Belgium, Portugal, Spain, China, and Albania issued e-ID to its citizen. The next major 
application of RFID in national use is the electronic passport (e-passport). In both cases, an 
RFID chip is integrated in the card/passport which stores personal data (e.g. name, date of 
birth, address) as well as biometrics (e.g. facial, fingerprint, and iris recognition of the bearer) 
(Juels, Molnar, & Wagner, 2005). Many countries already have implemented e-passports 
while many others are in the process. Again, Malaysia is the forerunner that issued e-
passport in 1998 which is followed by “approximately 95 countries ... including all G8 
nations” (Baird, 2012, p. 8; Kowlessar, 2012). In fact, there is a continuous global and 
regional pressure on the adoption of RFID in passports and identity cards. The International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has mandated for every traveller with RFID-enabled 
electronic passport (e-passport) by April 2014; however, the deadline has been extended to 
2017 (Kowlessar, 2012). Similarly, as a regional pressure, European Union (EU) is on its 
way to implement an RFID-based globally unique cross identification system with the 
intention of sharing the ID with allied countries for the purposes like Interpol investigations or 
visa-free-entry. That means, RFID is becoming a necessity than a choice for the citizens of a 
country. 
Privacy has been considered as the most important building block of ubiquitous technologies 
including RFID (Cas, 2005). An RFID-consumer survey conducted by Capgemini (2005) 
revealed that ‘privacy’ is perceived as the top concern; similar is observed with other 
ubiquitous technologies as well such as Smart Phones (Sutanto et al., 2013). The nature 
and level of privacy intrusion actually come from both the capability of collecting (personal) 
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information, and more importantly, because of the easy share of the information.  As the 
government-agencies put (an implicit) mandate to its people to use RFID technology, it has 
to take the most responsibilities to secure privacy of the people.  
This section focuses on the issue if there is any difference on RFID privacy – government vs. 
private use. The treaty of the European Union states that, everyone’s privacy right “shall be 
no interference by a public authority…except … is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime and freedoms of others’’ (Coblentz & Warshaw, 1956). 
Almost similar provisions are made in the U.S. and other countries too (Directive, 1995). 
Therefore, collecting and using citizens’ data through RFID by the state-applications is 
lawfully justified. Hence, consumer advocates do not object the government use of RFID for 
national interest (CASPIAN, 2003), but urge and demand that under no circumstance users’ 
personal and sensitive information should not be abused. In general, personal information 
means any information (a) relating directly or indirectly to a living individual; (b) from which it 
is practicable for the identity of the individual to be directly or indirectly ascertained; and (c) 
in a form in which access to or processing of the data is practicable (Hong-Kong-
Government, 2012). And sensitive information means personal data that reveals “racial and 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious, philosophical or moral beliefs, labour union 
membership, and information concerning health conditions or sexual habits or behaviour” 
(Argentine-Government, 2008). Hence, the information that is stored by the government 
agencies through e-IDs is personal and sensitive. Therefore, even for national interest, 
citizens’ information has to be authentically accessed by the right personnel and lawfully 
used for national interest – that means, even to a government, the information privacy is not 
waived. Unlike the customers who are reluctant to be tracked, the people are willing to 
sacrifice their privacy right for citizenship gain till of its authorized use (Cas, 2005). What is 
missing, however, is a convincing trade-off between the users’ expectation and degree of 
managing those expectations by the respective agencies; that means, what citizens believe 
as the tools of securing their privacy, and whether that are offered and managed by the 
government, at least to an acceptable level. Whenever people talk about ‘privacy’, 
researchers tend to find out the technologies solutions which may be effective but are not 
sufficient; the behavioural approach also has to be considered with even more 
efforts/importance. 
Irrespective of developing or developed countries, and in public or private sector, there are 
always some debates and lack of trust for using a strong technology like RFID which have 
the capability of tracking a person in real-time. Still, privacy is a big concern especially in 
developed countries, whereas people from developing countries are bit flexible, especially to 
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a government. Unlike a developed country, in many developing countries including 
Bangladesh, the constitutional bodies are not beyond the control of the government. For 
instance, the election commission in Australia is the sole authority that conducts every 
related activities to an election; however, this is not necessarily a practical truth in 
Bangladesh – here, a political government may use citizens’ data for their benefits such as 
political harassments to opposition parties or manipulate the election result (Akhtar, 2001). 
Moreover, discrimination on the basis of religion, political orientation, past criminal record or 
medical history is also very prominent, which is even be made easier with e-ID and hence a 
potential source of privacy abuse cases (Thomas, 2004). Still, the people are less sensitive 
to privacy; sometime they even feel good to be personally recognized, even if it breaches 
his/her privacy rights. Moreover, they be grateful for having a service even though it is 
his/her right, and usually do not bother how are they treated (by the government agencies) 
rather what they got at the end. Consequently, generally speaking, a Bangladeshi possess 
higher personal tolerance and place lower importance and high sacrifice on personal privacy 
– the things are just opposite in Australia (Ohkubo, Suzuki, & Kinoshita, 2005). For instance, 
in 1985 the Hawke Government proposed for a national system of identification, which was 
rejected in the 1988 referendum (Saunders, 2008). Again in 2006, (although claimed not as 
the national identity card), Howard Government proposed a ‘smart card’ “that would fight 
welfare cheats, terrorism” but “the scheme failed so quickly” and could not get that much 
success (Saunders, 2008). In both occasions, the main concern was the ‘privacy’. On the 
contrary, most of the Asian countries including Bangladesh have been experiencing national 
identity card for generations; and people here are believed to be more resilient on privacy.  
 
3. Methodology 
Epistemologically, positivism approach that is found to have dominating role in IS research is 
considered for this study (Y. Dwivedi, 2008). Driven by the objective and the nature of the 
study, within positivist paradigm, the mixed-method approach has been adopted which is 
actually a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. “The mixed method approach 
is appropriate as RFID research is still in its infancy [stage]”; hence, “a combination of 
methodological techniques assists in exploring the RFID adoption phenomenon more fully” 
(Brown & Russell, 2007b, p.252). First, a semi-structured question was developed from the 
existing literature which was employed during conducting the qualitative study. The 
qualitative field study explored and/or confirmed and/or contextualized the factors, and 
developed an initial research model; the model has been validated with quantitative data 
obtained from a survey.  
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In the first stage, qualitative data were obtained from two focus group discussions (FGD) and 
eight in-depth interviews conducted with RFID users in Perth (Western Australia), and Dhaka 
(Bangladesh). FGDs were conducted one in each city, consisting six and seven discussants 
in Perth and Dhaka, respectively – each having around 70 minutes. In addition, eight direct 
interviews (four in Perth and four in Dhaka) were conducted to explore users’ insights on this 
current research agenda. The participants have been using at least one RFID application 
provided by the State; SmartRider in Perth and SPASS in Dhaka – both are the ticketing 
cards for public transport commuting service. 
4. Findings of the qualitative study and developing the research model 
At the beginning of each the FGD and the interviews, the participants were given a brief 
outline of the RFID technology and the research purpose. The respondents were allowed to 
discuss on the privacy issues related with RFID technology, and were probed when required. 
To start the discussion, the following questions were asked: 
a. What is your perception on privacy, related to RFID technology use? 
b. What features you perceive as useful to maintain privacy on RFID data? 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) prepared a guideline 
for privacy protection that developed eight principles including collection limitation, data 
quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual 
participation, and accountability.  However, OECD guideline is not updated “for almost a 
quarter of century” which actually demand some contemporary approaches. The current 
study explored the guidelines and validated with empirical data, which is actually not 
contradictory but complimentary to the OECD principles; yet more generalized and 
perception-based. The following sections present the findings of the qualitative study, get 
support from the extent literature, and propose the hypotheses, while developing the 
dimensions of each concept (i.e. construct).  
4.1 Explicit consent 
The respondents from both sample perceive that, explicit consent from the citizen is 
essential for securing privacy; the clear consent must state that the “data would not be used 
in a manner other than it mean to be”, and the data owner-should sign the consent form or 
check the box in digital form. In literature, Cas (2005) proposed that, an “informed consent” 
should be obtained from the users that also would request the user for permission to collect, 
use and share the data. The ‘collection limitation principle’ of OECD guideline too refers to 
the awareness and informed consent of the people whose data are being collected (Cas, 
2005). However, associated agencies may use the data without further consent, but, “It is 
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not automatic to waive the privacy for every agency” when only one agency is granted the 
permission”.  
While collecting personal data, two methods are practiced by the agencies: opt out (where 
the citizens’ information may be distributed till they refuse to do so) and opt in (personal 
information cannot be shared till the permission is granted by the citizens) (Laudon & 
Laudon, 2012). Karjoth and Moskowitz (2005) found that, most of the privacy solutions are 
dependent on opt-out method, but, the opt-in choice can provide better result (Culnan & 
Bies, 2003). Similar observation is noted by the respondents who suspect that, government 
agencies abuse the opt-out model of data acquisition-and-use; they demand a quick shift to 
opt-in model. Collectively, the explicit consent is believed to have a positive effect increasing 
the privacy perceptions of the citizens; hence, the first hypothesis is developed as follows 
incur: 
Hypothesis 1 Explicit consent will increase users’ confidence regarding privacy 
issues. 
4.2 Detail privacy statement 
The filed study emphasized that, while collecting data, the agencies should publish and 
provide a detail privacy statement. When asked about what the things the respondents 
expect to see on the privacy statement, the following items come up as significant: the 
purpose of data collection, how the data will be collected and used, how long the data will be 
kept and the security policy of acquired data (i.e. security measures). The findings are in line 
with the prior literature (e.g. Eckfeldt, 2005; Floerkemeier, Schneider, & Langheinrich, 2005). 
Moreover, the ‘purpose specification principle’ of OECD guideline suggests for declaring the 
purpose and usage definition of data acquisition; similarly, the ‘use limitation’ emphasizes on 
not disclosure or transfer of the acquired data (Cas, 2005).  
The respondents from Bangladesh found that such detail statement is very rare and 
therefore develop ambiguity and lack of confidence on government’s use of citizens’ data. As 
far Australia sample is concerned, detail privacy statement is provided to the citizens, at 
least in theory, because of serious privacy concern of the citizens (Cas, 2005). Regardless, 
both samples claim that the detail statement would increase the confidence of the citizens 
toward securing their privacy. Therefore, the next hypothesis becomes:  
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Hypothesis 2 Detail privacy statement in personal data collection forms will increase 
users’ confidence regarding privacy issues.   
4.3 Legislative protection 
Government (through its official statutory, and administrative processes) is one of the most 
powerful sources, if not the most, of ensuring its citizens’ privacy (Thiesse, 2007); hence, 
regulatory restrictions are necessary (Cas, 2005). The respondents re-establish that, every 
country should have legislations against unauthorized access and/or use of personal data, 
harvested by government agencies. “Under no circumstance the State should tolerate any 
information-abuse” collected from an RFID system; “lack of legislation is one of the main 
reasons for privacy abuse with RFID in Malaysia”. They also mentioned that, although some 
existing privacy laws cover the use of data collected by electronic systems, more direct laws 
are to be considered dealing with the issues particular to RFID (Thiesse, 2007). 
“Governments should behave smartly with handling a smart technology” – hence, they 
appreciate and recommends contemporary law such as the E-Government Act 2002 of 
United Sates of America which provides a framework for the agencies to follow assessing 
the impact on privacy when implementing RFID-like technologies in particular. Literature too 
is in favour; proposing a four-step process of privacy ‘maintenance’, Cas (2005) proposed for 
developing “new regulatory fundaments of privacy where old ones are becoming insufficient” 
(p. 26).  
The Australian respondents believe that legislation against privacy abuse can secure their 
privacy; in the worst case, they can go to court and ask for compensation. On the contrary, 
the Bangladeshi respondents claim that, there is no such legislation in Bangladesh which 
can protect privacy of the citizens - while the movement has just has been initiated (Farjana, 
2012). Even so, the respondents are sceptical about the effectiveness of such law because, 
in general, the practice of laws is very insignificant; however, legislative protection should be 
in place, regardless. Hence, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 3 Legislative protection will increase the perceived privacy of the 
citizens. 
4.4 Data-owners’ accessibility 
From a consumer perception study, Günther and Spiekermann (2005) found that ‘‘regardless 
of privacy enhancing technology employed, consumers feel helpless toward the RFID 
environment, viewing the network as ultimately more powerful than they can ever be’’. As a 
solution, Thiesse (2007) proposed the RFID vendors to put more effort on user control on 
data and data security technologies. The respondents of the field study believe that, to their 
personal data, citizens must have a control over the amount of access of the data that the 
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government agencies have. They discussants believe that citizens, once they have duly 
evidenced their identity, should have the right to request obtaining the data and requesting 
to change the information on their personal data-field.  
Data owners’ accessibility also secure currency and accuracy of data with low costs – in line 
with the data quality principle of OECD (Cas, 2005). This would empower the users too. The 
Bangladeshi respondents claim that, unfortunately, people do not have sufficient access on 
their data; upgrading profile data “involves unnecessary hassle – both financial as well as 
mental”. Therefore, they are. On the contrary, the Australian respondents believe that the 
access on their personal data is more easy, and to modify. Yet, they demand that, instead of 
updating data on different agencies, a central information system would be more effective, 
which would be accessible and checkable by the users. Therefore, the fourth proposition is 
developed as follows: 
Hypothesis 4 Data owners’ accessibility will increase users’ confidence regarding 
privacy issues. 
4.5 Data authenticity 
To ensure privacy, it is a fundamental requirement that data should be safeguarded properly 
using privacy enhancing technologies. Additionally, “specially equipped and trained teams” 
should work on data preservation who also will “detect violation of data protection 
regulations” (Can 2005, p. 25). It is commonly observed especially in developing countries 
that data is not technologically secured enough, and hence is a soft target by hackers. More 
often, citizens’ data are sold to marketing organizations and hence violating privacy of the 
citizens. Therefore, the respondents urge that the systems require government-owned and 
government-managed central cryptographically-secured database, without sharing the 
information to third-party. Respective agency must take technical and organizational 
measures to guarantee the security and confidentiality of personal data in order to avoid 
their alteration, loss, and unauthorized consultation or treatment. Moreover, they 
emphasized that, more importantly, as techniques evolve every now and then the agencies 
should upgrade data authenticity with contemporary measures as well, not just relying on the 
past techniques. Another useful means of securing privacy is to anonymisze or 
pseudonymize the data (Cas, 2005).  The discussants agreed that, developing countries 
have less effective data-authenticity mechanism than that in developed countries; yet, 
developed countries need to adopt contemporary mechanisms that are effective to combat 
with hackers. Hence, the next proposition can be stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 5 Data authenticity will increase users’ confidence regarding privacy 
issues. 
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4.6 Communication channels 
Finally, it is found from the analysis that, the role of communication channels is very 
important to secure the privacy of the citizens. As a representation of the collective citizens, 
different advocacy groups can exercise pressures to the agencies as well as conduct privacy 
awareness programs which ultimately would secure the privacy indirectly. “It is not always 
possible to raise my [own] voice against privacy because I do not have a platform … the 
[representatives of the] civic society should take a leadership role and work as a watch-dog 
[protesting a privacy violation]”. Moreover, they suggested that, the government (agencies) 
must take initiative to improve the level of public knowledge and understanding about 
potential privacy issues related to RFID. Alternatively, such type of publicity and public-
awareness help the success of this technology as it removes ambiguity among the citizen. 
Moreover, opinion leaders can be engaged for public dialogue in the mass media; 
technology promoting agencies too can contribute in the process. Therefore, the roles of the 
communication channels are twofold: exercising pressure to the agencies to ensure privacy; 
and disseminating RFID-knowledge among the citizens. The final hypothesis hence is 
developed as follows: 
Hypothesis 6 Communications channels will increase users’ confidence regarding 
privacy issues. 
 
Figure 1 presents the antecedents of perceived privacy in public use of RFID technology, 
with their relations. 
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Figure 1  The proposed model for privacy perceptions in public use of RFID technology 
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5. The Empirical Study 
5.1 Data collection 
A questionnaire has been developed from the current literature and the results from the field 
study, in English; however, a translated version has been used for the Bangladesh sample. 
The translation was performed by a professional translator accredited by NAATI. The 
constructs were operationalized as reflective. For the survey, questionnaires were distributed 
among the commuters in Perth (Australia) and Dhaka (Bangladesh). In order to find 
responses from various segments, the survey was conducted in three consecutive week-
days and in weekend. Moreover, three different routes in each sample have been covered. 
Overall, 156 responses from Perth and 185 from Dhaka-sample were usable.  
 
5.2 Data Analyses and Results 
The current study applied component-based structural equation modelling (SEM) using PLS, 
considering its suitability over covariance-based SEM. While assessing the measurement 
properties, first, the item loadings have been examined. The research model consisted of 28 
manifest variables; considering 0.6 as the minimum cut-off level (Igbaria, Guimaraes, & 
Davis, 1995), two items were discarded from Australian sample, which is three in 
Bangladeshi sample. Then, the composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted 
(AVE) were checked to assess the internal consistency of the model. Referring to Table 1, 
all constructs met the acceptable criterion for composite reliability (0.7 or more) and AVE 
(0.5 or more) (Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009).  
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Table 1  Item loadings, composite reliability and AVE of the constructs 
Construct Item Loading 
(Australia) 
Loading 
(Bangladesh
) 
Explicit consent  The forms I form clearly state that: 
. Data will not be used for other purposes than 
mentioned  
0.727 0.828 
. Relevant agencies may share the data  0.776 0.658 
. Data can be shared before I refuse (opt-out)  0.612 0.691 
Data not shared till I permit (opt-in) 0.608 0.644 
Detail statement While the agencies collect persona data, they clearly declare: 
. The purpose 0.488
d
 0.745 
. The method  0.643 0.818 
. Where data will be used 0.668 0.775 
. How data will be secured 0.726 0.724 
. Who will access  0.908 0.719 
Legislative 
protection 
 
The legislations protecting personal privacy are:  
. serious against unauthorized access 0.789 0.728 
. sufficient to combat with cotemporary technologies 0.802 0.840 
. strong enough to secure my personal data 0.705 0.661 
. practiced regularly 0.614 0.484
 d
 
Data owners’ 
access 
 
I am given access to check my data  0.829 0.707 
I can modify my personal data when required  0.855 0.843 
Data modification is hassle-free 0.858 0.689 
 I contribute to the quality of my personal data 0.821 0.450
 d
 
Data authenticity I perceive that my personal data are secured with 
proper technologies 
0.804 0.355
 d
 
The database that contain my personal data is 
secured 
0.832 0.775 
The people who handle my personal are trustworthy 0.858 0.880 
My personal data are handled by trained people 0.719 0.625 
Communication 
channel 
 
Newspaper/magazines publish issues on RFID-
privacy 
0.429
d
 0.623 
Television/radio broadcasts issues on RFID-privacy  0.647 0.886 
Community leaders demonstrate on RFID-privacy 0.819 0.884 
Privacy advocates are serious on RFID issues 0.861 0.775 
Perceived 
privacy 
Privacy is a serious concern to me 0.875 0.897 
It is important to me to control the amount of access 
that government agencies have on my personal data 
0.841 
0.929 
I am not willing to share my personal information 
with companies who are not associated 
0.735 
0.911 
d – discarded item 
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In order to check the discriminant validity at construct level, the inter-correlation of the latent 
variables have been checked; the square root of AVEs exceeds the inter-correlations of the 
constructs with the other constructs in the model (see Table 2a, 2b). Moreover, the cross-
loading matrix (for each sample) was developed, but is not provided to save space; no item 
loads higher value on other constructs than on the construct it represents – confirming the 
discriminant validity at item level (Wynne W Chin, 2010; Igbaria et al., 1995). 
 
 
Table 2a Inter-correlations of the constructs of Australian sample 
Construct  CR AVE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Privacy (1) 0.895 
 
0.740 0.860       
Explicit consent (2) 0.742 
 
0.428 
 
0.241 
 
0.654 
 
     
Detail statement (3) 0.868 
 
0.569 
 
0.333 
 
0.487 
 
0.754 
 
    
Legislative protection (4) 0.795 
 
0.501 
 
0.273 
 
0.488 
 
0.620 
 
0.707 
 
   
Data owners’ access (5) 0.855 
 
0.597 
 
0.767 
 
0.135 
 
0.272 
 
0.280 
 
0.773 
 
  
Data authenticity (6) 0.837 
 
0.564 
 
0.648 
 
0.133 
 
0.268 
 
0.245 
 
0.666 
 
0.751 
 
 
Communication channel (7) 0.828 
 
0.552 0.662 0.284 0.449 0.405 0.699 0.668 0.743 
*Bold diagonal values are square root of AVE of relevant construct 
 
Table 2b Inter-correlations of the constructs of Bangladeshi sample 
Construct  CR AVE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Privacy (1) 0.937 0.832 0.912       
Explicit consent (2) 0.800 0.503 0.644 0.709      
Detail statement (3) 0.870 0.573 0.695 0.612 0.757     
Legislative protection (4) 0.814 0.597 0.698 0.603 0.728 0.772    
Data owners’ access (5) 0.815 0.597 0.727 0.532 0.723 0.693 0.773   
Data authenticity (6) 0.819 0.606 0.643 0.465 0.627 0.625 0.607 0.778  
Communication channel (7) 0.874 0.639 0.608 0.615 0.713 0.655 0.713 0.637 0.799 
*Bold diagonal values are square root of AVE of relevant construct 
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For assessing the structural model, bootstrap method was applied in PLS. The model 
accounted for 65.1% and 80.8% of the variance in perceived privacy with the Australian and 
Bangladeshi sample, respectively; both values are ‘substantial’ and acceptable for the 
current study (Henseler et al., 2009). The structural properties of the causal paths including 
standardized path coefficients, standard error (SE), and t-values for each sample in the 
hypothesized model are presented in Table 3. The results with Australian sample summarize 
that, perceived privacy is positively associated with data owners’ access, data authenticity, 
and explicit consent; while, communication channel will have a negative role. Similarly, the 
Bangladeshi respondents find that, perceived privacy is positively associated with explicit 
consent, detail statement, and communication channel. In both samples, the other 
hypotheses are partially supported (hypothesized direction of path-coefficient but with 
insignificant t-value). 
Our analysis is extended to multi-group analysis: to test the separate effects of the 
constructs on each model; which is done by comparing the pairs of path coefficients for 
identical models but based on different samples, with data collected in two different countries 
(Henseler & Fassott, 2010). In this analysis, the Smith-Satterwait test was employed 
because the samples are not distributed normally and the variances of these groups are 
assumed different (W.W. Chin, 2000; Moores & Chang, 2006). According to this procedure, 
a t-test is calculated by the following equation: 
 
𝑡 =
|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 1 − 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 2|
√(𝑆𝐸𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒1
2 + 𝑆𝐸𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒2
2 )
 
 
The ‘pathsample’ refers to the value of the path coefficient according to the subgroup, whereas 
SE refers to the standard error of the subgroup. Information for both was gathered from the 
bootstrapping sample procedures. The results are inserted in the last column of Table 3. It is 
found that detail statement, data owners’ access, and communication channel have different 
role in different countries. 
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Table 3   Test of the hypotheses and the multi-group (MG) analysis 
Construct to perceived 
privacy 
Australian sample (n=156) Australian sample (n=185) Multi-group 
result β value SE t value β value SE t value 
Explicit consent 0.127 0.065 1.967* 0.291 0.076 3.850*** 1.65 
Detail statement 0.009 0.068 0.132 0.295 0.083 3.540*** 2.65* 
Legislative protection 0.021 0.071 0.303 0.006 0.067 0.094 0.15 
Data owners’ access 0.687 0.118 5.828*** 0.097 0.091 1.063 3.95*** 
Data authenticity 0.255 0.087 2.941** 0.099 0.108 0.916 1.13 
Communication channel -0.181 0.097 2.130* 0.428 0.135 3.177** 3.67*** 
Significance level *p<0.05, **p<0.005, ***p<0.001 
 
6. Discussion and Implications 
Both Australian and Bangladeshi samples admit that, explicit consent would enhance users’ 
confidence regarding privacy issues; yet, the impact is larger in the latter sample. The 
Australians already have been practicing such consents and ‘getting disappointed’ seeing 
the non-significant influence of such provision in practice; however, Bangladeshis are still 
optimistic though are “far away” from practicing such consents. The Australian Senate 
Committee’s Report on Information Technology of November 2000 (popularly known as 
Cookie Monster? Privacy in the information society) recommends for implicit consent and 
opt-out method of personal data collection. However, the current study recommends for a 
modification of the more-than-a-decade year old report to explicit consent using opt-in 
approach. Similarly, the other sample admits that, peoples’ privacy perception toward RFID 
technology will be positive if the agencies provide a clear and complete consent about the 
data collection. The multi-group analysis reveals that, there is no statistical difference 
between the two groups and both admit the role of explicit consent.  
The Bangladeshi sample support that there is a significant and positive relationship between 
detail statement of data collection process and perceived privacy of the citizens using RFID 
technology. However, the Australian sample rejects such relationship which is even strongly 
supported by the multi-group analysis. This finding emphasizes that, while collecting 
personal data, a detail statement regarding the use and discloser of data should be 
provided. All the items (except one in Australian sample) of detail privacy received 
acceptable item loading which supplies a guideline to the government agencies; while 
providing the statement. To be more specific, it should clearly mention about the purpose of 
data collection, the method of data collection, where the data will be used, how they will be 
secured, and who would access on it. As a guideline, in order to avoid any confusion and 
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misuse the statement, “the privacy statement be on the same page as the form or 
prominently linked to it” (McDonagh, 2002, p. 335).  
Both samples reject that legislative protection may enhance peoples’ confidence regarding 
information privacy; moreover, the multi-group analysis established that the respondents 
from both samples perceive in a same direction. However, if there is any, the influence 
would be positive in both countries, while is perceived as more influential in Australian 
sample, which is supported by prior studies (e.g. McDonagh, 2002). Bangladeshi people 
express their frustration that government is the supreme authority that could ensure their 
privacy, but the government itself regularly abuse the citizens’ data. Therefore, they argue 
that, when the government itself violates the law, no legislation would protect them from 
privacy abuse. Similarly, although from different aspect, the Australian citizens believe that 
mere government legislations cannot protect their privacy, a holistic approach that 
interconnects the competence of different agencies should be in practice; but, first, the 
government need to build trust among the citizens (Cullen & Reilly, 2008).  
Regarding data owners’ access, the Australian respondents highly believe that, later on, the 
data owners’ should get the unconditional access to manipulate the data (e.g. add, delete, 
modify, and retrieve); however, the Bangladeshi sample partially support such notion – the 
difference in opinion is further supported by the multi-group analysis. Actually, citizens from 
developed countries want to check their private data often, and feel more empowered when 
they enjoy the access to their personal data – therefore, the citizen should get themselves 
be concerned on privacy data (Thiesse, 2007). In practice, it is already found that many 
countries (including Argentina, Canada) ensure that citizens can access information 
collected about them, can challenge the accuracy of the information and can request to 
correct their personal information, held by federal government organizations (Argentine-
Government, 2008; Canadian-Government, 2009). However, supported by the findings in the 
qualitative part of this current study, the Bangladeshi respondents are sceptical about their 
access and control on the database; they rather would for the government agencies to come 
to them and manipulate the data when the government requires.  
Regarding data authenticity to secure information privacy, the samples differ; the Australian 
sample accepts but the Bangladeshi sample rejects such relationship. To enhance citizens’ 
privacy, data should be secured by implementing contemporary techniques and 
technologies; furthermore, the relevant agencies should monitor the privacy parameters 
alongside. It should also be interpreted from Bangladesh sample that, technical and 
technological solutions are complimentary to the non-technical issues; in fact, most of the 
reported privacy abuses point the finger not to the technological solutions, but to the people 
who actually manage that (Davies, 1996).  
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Finally, since its deployment in different industries, RFID has caught a huge attention to the 
media people and the privacy advocacy groups – which is generally negative (Thiesse, 
2007). A lot of rumours and speculations than facts actually dominate the Internet (e.g. 
blogs) and the physical world that may develop negative perceptions especially on the 
borderline people, while sometimes they educate the users as well. As seen in the Australian 
sample, communication channel deters citizens forming positive perception on privacy. As 
the technique of producing antibiotic from the source itself, the communication channels 
could be used to disseminate the positive potentials of RFID technology, while offcourse 
putting pressure to the respective agencies not to compromise the privacy of the users. 
Moreover, open discussion with users, agency officials, and the technologists may play an 
important role (Thiesse, 2007). Even, the intellectuals may initiate broad and open debate 
and develop the course of actions where technology will be used for human benefits, not to 
make people as “the servants of technology” (Can 2005). Therefore, opinion leaders and 
privacy advocacy groups should examine the potential privacy-risks and propose the 
solution, refusing the technology in national use cannot be a solution, in most cases. As the 
Bangladesh sample suggests, communication channels can enhance the awareness 
regarding privacy and exercising pressure on government to enhance privacy probations 
and against privacy breaches. Similarly, government can use various communication 
channels to enhance public awareness on privacy issues.  
 
7. Conclusions 
7.1 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Few limitations of the current study are worthwhile to mention so that they can be addressed 
in future. First, the nature of this research was exploratory: developing and validating a 
theory: what are the antecedents of perceived privacy. In doing so, we explored the 
antecedents and examined their effect on perceived privacy. Future studies could adapt the 
behavioural adoption-diffusion theories/models integrating the relevant established 
constructs (perceived trust, for instance) along with perceived privacy and the indirect effect 
of the six antecedents, explored in the current study. Moreover, the interrelation among the 
constructs (e.g. communication channel on legislative protection) can be examined. The 
second limitation is actually associated with using the multi-group analysis. This study used 
two separate samples from two different countries using same questionnaire; the 
questionnaire was translated from English to Bengali - the translation may have led to a 
change in meaning for some question-statements, which eventually may “artificially inflate” 
the differences in two samples (Kock, 2013). Third, this study adopted cross-sectional 
survey collecting responses from population at a single given time; but, privacy perceptions 
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may reshaped after using for a while, in different applications. Hence future longitudinal data 
would confirm the variance, if there is any. Finally, the field studies and the surveys were 
conducted in two cities of the two countries. Therefore, the samples not necessarily 
represent the population properly. Future study could investigate the model in representative 
cities and address the differences, if any. 
7.2 Theoretical contribution 
Human rights are both consequence as well as prerequisite of a democratic society. The 
consequence of perceived privacy on adoption intention of RFID technology is comparatively 
well researched, especially in the context of retail customers (e.g. Hossain & Prybutok, 
2008); however, most of them failed to explore its antecedents. Also, the behavioural 
solutions protecting privacy is comparatively less-studied; Eckfeldt (2005) argued that, the 
key to a successful acceptance of RFID technology is “how it considers the equation from 
consumers’ point of view”. Hence, a general ‘equation’ is – people will accept RFID 
technology by lowering the risk of losing their personal data, but the question remains 
unsolved how the privacy risks can be reduced. More glaringly, privacy study in public use of 
RFID is even least studied whereas RFID is increasingly adopted in public applications. The 
current study is a single initiative that explores the dimensions for securing privacy in the 
context of RFID-use in public applications and validates them with survey data, obtained 
from two countries. Therefore, the current study contributes significant knowledge in 
information privacy domain, especially when citizens use technologies in government-
introduced-and-managed applications.  
From an extensive filed study conducted in Australia and Bangladesh, the antecedents of 
perceived privacy have been explored, contextualized with existing literature, and propose a 
research model; then, the model has been validated with data obtained from two surveys 
conducted in these two countries. The empirical results established that explicit consent, 
data owners’ access, and data authenticity have positive impact toward privacy perceptions 
of Australian people, while communication channel has negative impact. The same model 
has been tested in Bangladesh and found that, explicit consent, detail statement, and 
communication channel have positive effect on privacy perceptions. This study also 
performed a multi-group analysis and revealed that the two samples differ in perception 
regarding detail statement, data owners’ access, and communication channel. 
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